Venezuela

Country Overview & Political Climate

Venezuela is legally a multi-party, constitutional republic, but in practice the regime of Nicolás Maduro exercises control over all public institutions, including the judiciary, legislature, electoral authorities, and security forces. The country has experienced a sustained collapse of democratic governance since the Chávez era, with institutions progressively subordinated to executive control beginning in 2004 when then-President Chávez packed the Supreme Court with loyalists.

Venezuela held presidential elections on July 28, 2024. International observers — including the United Nations Panel of Electoral Experts, the Carter Center, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and the United States — raised serious concerns about the integrity of the process. The electoral council declared Maduro the winner with over 51 percent of the vote, but refused to release precinct-level tally sheets or conduct the legally required audits and citizen verification processes. The Carter Center, relying on opposition-obtained tally sheets, concluded that opposition candidate Edmundo González had won the election by a significant margin. Following the announcement, González was subjected to an arrest warrant for conspiracy and related charges, and was forced to flee the country. Maduro was inaugurated for another term in January 2025.

In the lead-up to the election, authorities intensified repression, targeting human rights defenders and opposition members with arrests, arbitrary disqualifications of candidates — including prominent opposition leader María Corina Machado — and tightening restrictions on civic space. Following the disputed results, thousands of peaceful protesters took to the streets across the country, including in low-income areas traditionally supportive of the government. Authorities responded with killings, mass arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, and widespread intimidation.

Over 20 million Venezuelans — out of a total population of approximately 28.8 million — live in multidimensional poverty. Roughly 8 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2014, constituting one of the largest displacement crises in the Western Hemisphere. After the July 2024 election, 43 percent of Venezuelans surveyed indicated they were considering leaving the country.

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Human Rights Conditions

Post-Election Repression and Political Imprisonment

Following the disputed July 28 election results, Venezuelan authorities deployed what the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (FFM) described as “the harshest and most violent mechanisms” of the state’s repressive apparatus, generating a widespread climate of fear. Human Rights Watch documented credible reports of 23 killings of protesters and bystanders and identified evidence linking security forces and pro-government armed groups known as “colectivos” to several of these killings. The local pro bono legal group Foro Penal reported over 1,900 political prisoners arrested since July 29, 2024, including 42 adolescents between the ages of 14 and 17 who remained imprisoned as of late November 2024. These arrests contribute to a total of 17,882 politically motivated arrests in Venezuela since 2014, according to Foro Penal.

The government’s “Operation Knock Knock” (Operación Tun Tun) involved mass detentions of protesters, targeted arrests of critics, and the use of social media by government and security forces to instill fear in the population. The government also encouraged citizens to report on demonstrators through apps including Ven App. Security forces conducted abusive raids, particularly in low-income communities. Prosecutors charged hundreds with broadly defined crimes carrying harsh sentences, including “incitement to hatred,” “resistance to authority,” and “terrorism.” Detainees were frequently held in incommunicado detention for weeks, denied the right to choose their own legal representation, and subjected to virtual hearings that raised significant due process concerns. Some detainees, including adolescents, were reportedly beaten and subjected to other ill-treatment in custody.

Arbitrary Detention and Wrongful Detention of Foreign Nationals

The U.S. Department of State has included a Risk of Wrongful Detention indicator on the Travel Advisory for Venezuela. Regime-aligned security forces have detained U.S. citizens for extended periods, the Maduro regime does not notify the U.S. government of such detentions, and U.S. government access to detained citizens is not granted. The U.S. Embassy in Caracas suspended operations in 2019 and cannot provide consular services or protection within Venezuela.

Attacks on Human Rights Defenders

Repressive measures against human rights defenders increased dramatically in 2024, with over 592 attacks registered in the first half of the year — a 92 percent increase compared to the same period in 2023. Since the July 28 election, authorities canceled the passports of human rights defenders, critics, political leaders, and independent journalists to prevent them from leaving the country; the IACHR reported at least 36 such cases as of August 2024. Human rights defenders Rocío San Miguel — detained at Caracas Airport in February 2024 — and Javier Tarazona — arrested in July 2021 — remained imprisoned at the time of HRW’s reporting.

In February 2024, the Venezuelan government suspended the activities of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the country. In August 2024, the government-controlled National Assembly approved a bill requiring all NGOs to register with and submit detailed documentation to the executive branch, with vague grounds for dissolution that severely undermine freedom of association.

Freedom of Expression and Press

The government has systematically targeted independent media through intimidation, censorship, judicial harassment, and closures. Between January and August 2024, the free-speech monitoring group Espacio Público recorded 507 violations of freedom of expression, including 168 cases of intimidation, 101 cases of censorship, and 65 cases of judicial harassment. Security forces detained at least 19 press workers. The national telecommunications authority closed 15 radio stations. Government authorities blocked at least 35 digital news websites and NGO platforms, as well as social media platforms including X and Wikipedia, and the encrypted messaging application Signal.

Impunity and the Collapse of Judicial Independence

The Venezuelan judiciary ceased functioning as an independent branch of government following the 2004 judicial reform, which subordinated the Supreme Court to executive authority. That alignment has been maintained and deepened under Maduro. Investigations into deaths that occurred during protests and security operations are persistently delayed, and the OHCHR has reported that these investigations have failed to address the chain of responsibility. In March 2024, the International Criminal Court authorized its prosecutor to resume an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela. In September 2024, an Argentine court issued arrest warrants against Maduro and more than a dozen other government officials under the principle of universal jurisdiction for alleged crimes against humanity.

Humanitarian Crisis

14.2 million Venezuelans face severe humanitarian needs. Essential medicines were unavailable at over 28 percent of pharmaceutical dispensaries as of March 2024, and many of those available were unaffordable. Hunger affects approximately 5.1 million people. The UN Humanitarian Response Plan remained underfunded at less than 28 percent of its target as of early December 2024. The ongoing crisis forces many Venezuelans to adopt extreme coping strategies, including skipping meals, increasing workloads, exchanging goods for sex, or fleeing the country.

Women’s Rights and Femicide

Abortion is criminalized in Venezuela except when the pregnant person’s life is at risk. Access to sexual and reproductive health services, including maternal care, family planning, and contraception, remains inadequate. The NGO Cepaz documented 127 femicides and 51 attempted femicides between January and September 2024. The government has not released official femicide data since 2016.

Indigenous Peoples

Indigenous communities in Venezuela disproportionately bear the burden of malnutrition, extreme poverty, and environmental degradation, including from extractive activities within their territories. Illegal mining has forcibly displaced many indigenous communities. Security forces reportedly collaborate with illegal miners, including by providing mercury for gold mining, and have subjected civilians to disproportionate use of force.

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Security & Crime

Venezuela presents extreme security risks. The U.S. Department of State designates Venezuela at Level 4: Do Not Travel due to crime, civil unrest, kidnapping, and the arbitrary enforcement of local laws. Caracas is assessed as a Critical-threat location for both crime and political violence directed at or affecting U.S. government interests. The Travel Advisory also flags wrongful detention, terrorism, and poor health infrastructure as additional concerns.

In 2024, Venezuela recorded more than 6,884 homicides — approximately 26.2 per 100,000 inhabitants — making it one of the countries with the highest murder rates in the Western Hemisphere, ranking below only Honduras and Ecuador by this measure. This figure includes deaths caused by police or military action in addition to criminal homicides. While overall violence showed a modest decline from 2023, continuing a trend of the prior three years, this reduction is attributed in part to migration of young Venezuelans, economic constraints on criminal activity, and cartel consolidation of extortion markets rather than improved governance. Meanwhile, property crimes have increased as a partially dollarized economy has made petty theft more attractive to criminals.

Extortion rackets are pervasive, particularly in western states such as Zulia and Táchira and in agricultural states such as Guárico and Apure. Large criminal gangs issue videotaped threats to prospective victims via WhatsApp and social media. Businesses of all sizes are targeted.

Kidnapping is a significant threat. The U.S. Department of State has included a Kidnapping indicator on the Travel Advisory. Kidnapping gangs operating in Caracas and surrounding states — including Miranda, Carabobo, and Aragua — are well-armed, with some carrying grenades. Colombian guerrilla groups, particularly the ELN, have engaged in kidnapping in Venezuelan border territories. Express kidnappings targeting rideshare passengers also occur. Most kidnapping cases go unreported because victims believe police may be involved or incapable of resolving the situation.

Colectivos — pro-government armed groups such as La Piedrita, Los Tupamaros, and Alexis Vive — operate throughout the country with de facto state tolerance, engaging in voter intimidation, neighborhood control, violence against protesters, and criminal activity. The FFM linked colectivos to killings of protesters in the post-election crackdown.

Venezuela is the home country of Tren de Aragua, a federally designated Foreign Terrorist Organization engaged in human trafficking, firearms and drug trafficking, extortion, and gang violence. The organization has expanded its operations into Colombia, Peru, Chile, and the United States.

Police and security forces are pervasively corrupt and operate with impunity. Media reports regularly identify police involvement in illegal detentions, extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and excessive use of force. The judicial branch is beholden to the regime, and the Supreme Court supports executive repression of critics. Police response to crime is generally slow; officers frequently do not arrive until many hours after an initial call.

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Asylum Eligibility Grounds

Political Opinion — Venezuelans who have been persecuted or who face a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their actual or imputed political opinions — including opposition members, protest participants, political candidates and their family members, campaign workers, polling station monitors, voters who opposed the regime, and individuals perceived as challenging Maduro’s authority — have among the strongest bases for asylum relief of any nationality currently before U.S. immigration courts. The documented pattern of politically motivated arrests, incommunicado detention, prosecution under vague anti-state laws, extrajudicial violence by colectivos, and passport confiscation provides extensive evidentiary support. Foro Penal’s documentation of 17,882 politically motivated arrests since 2014 and over 1,900 following the July 2024 election alone is directly relevant to establishing both the pattern and the well-foundedness of individual fears.

Particular Social Group — Potentially cognizable PSGs include: members of opposition parties and their family members; witnesses to government-sponsored violence; individuals who publicly defied Operation Knock Knock or who were targeted in its raids; LGBTQ+ individuals facing persecution on account of their identity; former regime members or security force personnel who have defected or cooperated with international investigations; and members of targeted social groups such as human rights defenders, journalists, and NGO workers.

Human Rights Defenders and Journalists — Venezuela’s documented and dramatic increase in attacks on human rights defenders — a 92 percent increase in the first half of 2024 alone — and the systematic targeting of journalists through detention, harassment, censorship, and platform blocking support asylum claims based on political opinion or imputed political opinion. The suspension of OHCHR operations by the government and the new NGO registration law, which provides broad grounds for dissolution of civil society organizations, further support claims of government persecution of advocacy work.

Persecution by Criminal or Paramilitary Groups — Individuals targeted by colectivos, Tren de Aragua, or other criminal organizations operating with state tolerance or collaboration may have viable claims if the harm is connected to a protected ground and the government is unable or unwilling to protect them. Venezuela’s pervasive police corruption, police involvement in criminal activity, and the documented collaboration between security forces and armed groups support a showing of government unwillingness to protect.

Gender-Based Persecution — Venezuelan women who have experienced domestic violence, femicide threats, or sexual violence, and who can demonstrate the government’s failure to protect them — supported by Venezuela’s near-total absence of official femicide reporting since 2016 and the documented inadequacy of state response — may have viable asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group.

Humanitarian Conditions as Corroboration — While economic hardship alone does not establish asylum eligibility, Venezuela’s humanitarian conditions — over 20 million in multidimensional poverty, critical medicine shortages, and widespread food insecurity — are relevant background context for evaluating the credibility and severity of persecution-based claims and for supporting claims for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture where direct return would expose an individual to extreme harm.

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Sources: OSAC Venezuela Country Security Report (March 2025); Human Rights Watch World Report 2025 – Venezuela.